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Abstract: I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with “tendencies” as causal 
connections. Not, however, as “necessary connexions”: causes are not sufficient, they 
do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the 
concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa-
tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic 
one. 
Different authors who propose theories of causation mean different 
things by a “theory of causation”. Many theories of causation pro-
posed today are theories, or analyses, of the concept of causation. 
They say whether the concept of causation is to be analyzed, whether 
causal statements can be reduced to statements of some other kind, 
and what “ontological commitment” there is in causal talk. For ex-
ample, the simple regularity theory of the concept of causation 
claims that the statement “A caused B” can be replaced by the state-
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2ment “A and B occurred, and events like A are always followed by 
events like B”. But other theories of causation (for example Arm-
strong 1997, ch. 14) are intended to be, not about the concept of cau-
sation, but about causation. They try to describe what is the case 
where one thing causes another, they try to describe the truthmakers 
of causal statements. For example, they say whether in every case of 
causation there is what Hume called “power, force, energy, or neces-
sary connexion”. I call theories of the former kind semantic theories 
of causation and theories of the latter kind metaphysical theories of 
causation. Some philosophers believe that analysis of the concept of 
causation reveals, for example, whether there are causal connections. 
As I do not share this belief, I do not attempt to analyze the concept. 
In this article I shall propose a non-Humean metaphysical theory of 
causation. In order to clarify what the theory is designed to do I shall
first briefly discuss the Humean line of thought. 
The Humean line of thought
What I call the Humean line of thought, leading to the denial of the 
existence of “causal connexions”,1 runs as follows. All our concepts, 
at least the proper ones, are copies of sense impressions or are com-
posed of such concepts. In order to explore whether we have a cer-
tain concept or what exactly it is we need to look for the sense im-
pression of which it is a copy, or for the concepts of which it is com-
posed and for the sense impressions of which they are copies. If you 
want to know whether a certain term has a meaning and what it is, 
then, in Hume’s words, you “need to enquire, from what impression 
1 However, Galen Strawson (1989) claims that Hume himself did not deny the 
existence of causal connections. 
3is that supposed idea derived?” (Enquiry, 2.9). If you do not find that 
impression then say that the term is meaningless or define the term 
in terms of concepts that are copies of impressions. 
Now consider causation. Do we ever have any impression of a “con-
nexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy” between a cause 
and its effect? Do we ever see a cause bringing something about? We 
do not, says the Humean. For example, when we see one billiard ball 
hitting another one we see the movement of the first ball and then 
the movement of the second ball, but we see no connection, no 
power, no bringing about. Therefore “cause” is to be defined other 
than in terms of a causal connection. Hume therefore defines a cause 
as “an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar 
to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second” (Enquiry, 
7.29). Many other, more sophisticated definitions have been pro-
posed which also avoid mentioning any kind of causal connection. 
I have two objections against the Humean line of thought. First, the 
Humean uses the wrong method for finding out the meaning of a 
term. It is not the right method for finding out the meaning of state-
ments like “A caused B” to look for the sense impressions of which 
the concept of causation, or its constituents, are copies. What one 
means with a certain expression is best discovered simply by think-
ing hard and by trying to spell out the thought more clearly using 
other words and examples. If one is not aware of the meaning of an 
expression, then one cannot even start to look for the corresponding 
sense impressions because one does not know what sort of impres-
sions one should look for. 
Some take the Humean line of thought to support the view that there 
are no causal connections. Here I object, secondly, that this is not the 
case. The Humean method is not the right one for finding out 
4whether there are causal connections. In order to find out whether 
there are Xs one does not need a theory about the origin of our con-
cept of an X, and having such a theory does not help. To find out 
whether there is butter in the fridge we do not need a theory about 
what gave us the idea of butter in the first place. And construing a 
theory of how we acquired the idea of luminupherous ether does not 
help us for finding out whether there is such stuff. Similarly with 
causation. Of course, we should consider what we have in mind 
when we make claims of the form “A caused B”, but we do not find 
out whether there are causal connections by investigating how we 
developed the concept of a causal connection. 
So how do we find out whether there are causal connections? How in 
general should we approach questions about the existence of some-
thing in metaphysics? We must consider what counts in favour of it 
and what counts against it. We must look for evidence. In order to 
find out whether there are Xs we must ask whether things are as we 
should expect them to be on the assumption that there are Xs, and 
how likely it is that things would be as they are on the assumption 
that there are no Xs. We must ask how the things we know are best 
explained, with or without Xs.2 For example, under the assumption 
that there are no causal connections, should we expect the regular 
and predictable behaviour of at least some of the things in our uni-
verse? Does the assumption that there are causal connections explain 
the behaviour of these things, and how well can it be explained with-
out that assumption? 
2 For an account of how in metaphysics we correctly evaluate how strong evidence 
something is for the existence of some X, see (Swinburne 2004, ch. 3). Swinburne 
applies his account to the question whether there is a God. 
5The Humean pursues an entirely different method. He asks how the 
concept of a cause is to be defined, and if the definition mentions 
causal connections then he says that there are causal connections, 
and if it does not then he says that there are no causal connections or 
that we have no reason to believe in them. Similarly, many philoso-
phers today answer questions about the existence of something by 
discussing “ontological commitments”. The existence of Xs is not 
assumed if in the statements expressing our beliefs all the terms used 
in certain ways (i.e. if we “quantify over” Xs) can be defined without 
mentioning Xs, or if the statements mentioning Xs can be trans-
formed into other statements. In my view this is wrongheaded. We 
should believe in the existence of something if and only if we have 
evidence for it, and we find evidence not by analyzing the concept of 
X but by considering whether some of the things we know count for 
or against the existence of Xs. 
Most contemporary texts about causation pay homage to the 
Humean line of thought. Many assume that Hume’s claim that we do 
not observe causal connections provides strong support for the view 
that there are no causal connections. Wesley Salmon, for example, 
says in this vein that “the concept of causality has [...] been philoso-
phically suspect ever since David Hume’s devastating critique” 
(Salmon 1984, 136).3 And although Hume’s associationist theory of 
concept formation has been widely abandoned, even many non-
Humeans who believe in causal connections still think that a de-
3 Hume’s claim that we do not observe causal connexions was already put forward 
by the Arabic philosopher Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and was well known in Hume’s 
days. Discussing the case of a cloth in a fire turning black and becoming ashes, Al-
Ghazali argues that “observation proves only a simultaneity, not a causation”  
(Averroes, 1954, 317). 
6fender of causal connections needs to hold that we observe causal 
connections or that he needs to explain how we acquire the concept 
of causation.4 Of course, observing causal connections is a good rea-
son for believing in their existence, but one does not need to observe 
them in order to be justified in believing in them, and one does not 
need an explanation of the origin of the concept of a causal connec-
tion. 
The metaphysical theory of causation I shall propose now is based on 
the assumption that we find out what causation is and whether there 
are causal connections not by conceptual analysis and by looking for 
ontological commitments but by considering evidence, such as the 
predictability of many events in our universe. It is not an analysis of 
the concept of causation, but an attempt to describe what is there 
where one event causes another one. The concept of a cause, unlike 
the concept of a bachelor, is, I assume (like Armstrong 1997, 202, 
and Swinburne 1997), simple, it is not to be analyzed. Therefore, 
when I say what causation is, I shall not call it a definition but a de-
scription, because “definition” usually means definition of a concept. 
One could also call it an ontological analysis, which is what Arm-
strong calls his (metaphysical) theory of causation. 
4 For example, Richard Swinburne (1997, 86) writes: “Someone who holds this 
[that the notion of causation is unanalysable] must give an account of how we get 
epistemic access to the notion – how we learn what is meant by something being a 
cause, and how we learn to recognise instances of causation.” (Fales, 1990, 11) justi-
fies his belief in causal connexions by arguing that “we experience causal relations”. 
7The universe’s carrying on
Imagine a universe U which is like ours but consists just of two rocks 
in space, slowly moving away from each other. The rocks have been 
there for quite a while, until time t. What will be the case a short time 
later, say at t2. How will things carry on after t?5 There could be after 
t a universe which is like ours was in 1809 AD. The existence of such 
a universe is obviously possible, so there could be such a universe 
after t. The universe which until t contained just two rocks after t 
may be like ours was in 1809 and hence contain the Pleiades, a planet 
with bears and honey bees, a King of Bavaria, and much more. 
Or there could be an empty universe after t. The rocks could disap-
pear. 
Or there may be no physical universe after t, not even space. 
But it is very likely that neither of these possibilities will be realized. 
It is very likely that after t there will be no less and no more than two 
rocks, just as before t. There is something about U before t which 
makes it likely that after t there will be a universe quite like the one 
before t. What is the case at t lowers the probability of some possible 
futures and raises the probability of others (or perhaps of exactly one 
particular possible future). It seems that the universe before t is not 
neutral about how it will carry on after t. It is not, as David Lewis 
(1986, ix) holds, just a “mosaic of local patterns”. Not all possible 
ways of carrying on are equally likely. It has a bias towards carrying 
on in one way rather than in one of the many other possible ways. 
There is what we may call a tendency in U to carry on in a certain 
5 By “after t” I mean “in a period of time as short as you wish beginning at t”; by 
“before t”, or “until t”, I mean “in a period of time as short as you wish ending at t”; 
by “at t” I mean “before and after t”. 
8way. A tendency towards carrying on so that after t1 there are just 
two rocks being at certain positions at certain times later than t1, 
rather than towards ceasing to exist or towards being as our universe 
was in 1809 AD. 
Imagine there is in the universe also a window towards which rock A 
is moving with constant velocity. At t1 A is close to the window. 
There is then a tendency in that universe towards A breaking the 
window. The universe at t1 is biased towards carrying on in this way. 
If then rock A did carry on and broke the window we would say that 
the rock’s moving so-and-so caused the breaking of the window. 
Tendencies, as I will explain, are the phenomenon that is constitutive 
for event causation. They make, under certain circumstances, causal 
claims true. 
In the universe just described, rock B is not relevant for the tendency 
of that universe at t1 to carry on in such a way that the window will 
break shortly afterwards (if we neglect the gravitational force). So not 
everything at a time is relevant for every aspect of the tendency of 
that universe at that time. If a state of affairs S evolved out of the ten-
dency of the universe, at t1, towards S, then some states of affairs at t1
are relevant for there being that tendency, but there may be others 
that are not relevant. I call the state of affairs that is the whole of all 
states of affairs that are in this sense relevant for the tendency the 
basis of the tendency. One might want to say that the rock has a ten-
dency to break the window, but I talk only of tendencies as being 
based on states of affairs because usually the factors relevant for a 
tendency are not all in one thing and not all properties of a thing are 
relevant for the tendency. 
What reason do we have to believe in the existence of tendencies? If 
there were no tendencies, then there should be no successful predic-
9tions. Any state of the universe would equally likely be followed by 
any other possible state. A state of the universe as it was one hour 
after the Big Bang would equally likely be followed by a state in 
which it is quite like ours was in 1809 AD than by any other possible 
state. There would be no way to predict an eclipse because the moon 
just before moving between sun and earth, would, at any time, be 
equally likely to stand still than to move on. Our universe is not like 
that. In many situations things behave predictably. We can predict 
solar eclipses, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc. This is best explained by 
assuming that what is the case at one time makes a difference to what 
is the case at later times; it makes the world heading in a certain di-
rection. There are in the universe at each time tendencies towards 
carrying on in certain ways, and we can learn in what kinds of situa-
tions there are what kinds of tendencies.
One might object that the reason why we can make predictions is 
that there are laws of nature that are, or entail, regularities.6 But that 
there are regularities is exactly what needs to be explained (cf. Foster 
2004, ch. 4). If there were no tendencies it would be extremely im-
probable that the universe behaved as it does. Why, for example, 
whenever in the whole past some released a coin from his grasp (and 
nothing else acted on the coin), did it fall down until it reached some 
solid surface to give it support? If there were no tendencies, this 
would be extremely improbable because whenever someone releases 
a coin all possible ways of carrying on would be equally likely. Hume 
explains the fact that we make predictions (“we make no ... scruple of 
foretelling”) through the fact that things behave with regularity (En-
6 I owe this point to ...  I myself hold, as I shall argue elsewhere, that laws of nature 
do not entail Humean regularities, but I grant this point here for the sake of the ar-
gument. 
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quiry, ch. 7). But what calls for an explanation is the fact that things 
behave with regularity at all. This fact Hume leaves unexplained. It is 
extremely improbable that it has no explanation, and I have sug-
gested that it is best explained by assuming the existence of tenden-
cies. What the state of the world is at one time gives it a bias towards 
carrying on in one way rather than in one of the many other possible 
ways and thus makes a difference to the state of the world at later 
times. 
There is, however, an alternative to believing in tendencies. The Ara-
bic philosopher Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) put forward an explanation 
of the order and predictability of many events in the universe that 
does not involve causal connections: he argued that as we do not ob-
serve causal connections we should assume that there are none and 
that God brings about every event directly. The rock’s existence be-
fore t has no relevance for what there will be after t except insofar as 
God takes the existence of a rock before t as a reason and occasion 
for letting there be a rock after t too. Some events are predictable be-
cause God brings about events according to an order that we can dis-
cover. He does so because he likes order and because he wants to 
make events predictable for us. The existence of a God who brings 
about every event directly and has a reason to do so in a way that 
makes events predictable for us explains why so many events are 
predictable. This view is called occasionalism (see Averroes, 1954, 
316-318). It is clearly preferable to Hume’s view, which offers no ex-
planation at all for the predictability of so many events. But here I 




Let us develop this theory and introduce some terminology. I refer to 
a bias of the world towards carrying on in a certain way, rather than 
in one of the many other possible ways, after a certain time t1 by say-
ing that there was at t1 a tendency7 T towards S at t2, where S is a 
state of affairs that came about if things developed according to the 
tendency. By saying that the world, or the universe, at t1, has a ten-
dency towards S at t2 I mean that, although maybe not everything at 
t1 is relevant for the tendency, there is a tendency towards S and no 
tendency that counteracts that tendency. Taking together all tenden-
cies there are there is a tendency towards S. In this case I also say that 
there is a total tendency towards S. 
Usually for a tendency T at t1 towards S at t2 not everything at t1 is 
relevant for the obtaining of T. We specify what is relevant for the 
obtaining of a tendency by describing which properties of which 
things at which time are relevant. Such a description I call a descrip-
tion of a state of affairs. (In my view, one could equally well call it a 
description of an event.) By a state of affairs I mean a portion of real-
ity which may consist of concrete entities, i.e. things with all their 
properties, or of abstract entities, i.e. things with only some of their 
properties. For example, a rock’s having mass M is a state of affairs. 
A tendency is based on a state of affairs. I take this relation between a 
7 Popper uses the term “propensity” (Popper 1974 and 1990), (Mellor 1995) uses 
“chance” for something similar to tendencies. (Freddoso 1986) speaks of natural 
propensities, tendencies, inclinations, and necessities, but none of these concepts is 
equivalent to my concept of tendency. Using the term “tendency” I follow John Stu-
art Mill (Mill 1872, Book III). 
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tendency and a state of affairs as a primitive.8 Perhaps one can find 
out more about what “is based on” refers to, but I shall not attempt 
to do so here. 
The canonical form of referring to a tendency is “tendency T, based 
on A at t1, towards B at t2”. It does not involve the ordinary language 
expression “... has a tendency to ...”. Expressions like “the ball had a 
tendency to fall” may be used informally for saying that there was a 
tendency towards the ball being at certain positions at certain later 
times. That tendency may also be referred to by saying that there was 
a tendency towards the ball moving downwards. 
When I speak of tendencies I always mean singular tendencies, as 
opposed to general tendencies as in “Iron tends to expand when 
heated” or “Bees tend to be aggressive before a thunder storm”. Pre-
sumably sometimes singular tendencies are at least parts of the 
truthmakers of statements like “Iron when heated tends to expand”, 
but such statements play no role in my theory. 
By saying that tendency T based on A at t1 towards B at t2 was real-
ized I mean that things carried on according to the tendency so that 
B occurred. Further, I say in that case that B was the result of the ten-
dency and that the tendency led to B. 
Tendency T based on A at t1 towards B at t2 is also a tendency to-
wards a certain state of affairs at a certain time between t1 and t2. For 
each time between t1 and t2 there is a state of affairs towards which T 
is a tendency. That is, a tendency is about the world’s carrying on 
after a certain time in a certain way, and that way can be specified by 
describing a state of affairs which would occur if nothing intervened 
8 An alternative wording would be to say, instead of “Tendency T towards B(t2) is 
based on A(t1)”, “A tends towards B”. I owe this point to Randall Dipert. 
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before then. I individuate tendencies so that tendencies towards dif-
ferent states of affairs (at different times) count as “the same ten-
dency” if they are based on the same state of affairs at the same time 
and point in the same direction. 
By saying that tendency T based on A at t1 towards C at t3 was real-
ized until B at t2 I mean that things carried on in accordance with 
the tendency until t2 when it had led to B. I say in this case also that 
the tendency was partially realized, or realized until t2.
There can be two tendencies at a time whose realizations are incom-
patible. There can be at t1 a tendency based on A towards B at t2 as 
well as a tendency based on P towards Q at t2 where B and Q are in-
compatible. The states of affairs meant by “P” and “Q”, e.g. the ap-
ple’s being at position r and the stone’s being at position r, cannot 
both come to be realized. In that case either one of the two tenden-
cies overrides the other one so that one is realized and the other one 
not, or both tendencies together constitute a third one, a resulting 
tendency. 
A resulting tendency is a special case of what I call a complex ten-
dency. A complex tendency C is one whose basis has parts that are 
bases of tendencies that constitute C. A resulting tendency is a com-
plex tendency that has constituent tendencies that are conflicting. A 
complex tendency that is not a resulting tendency has the following 
form. If A1(t1) is the basis of a tendency towards B1(t2), and A2(t1) 
is the basis of a tendency towards B2(t2) (where B1 and B2 are com-
patible), then A1 plus A2 is the basis of a complex tendency towards 
B1 plus B2. 
If tendency T based on A at t1 towards B at t2 is realized then there is 
what I call a direct process leading from A to B, with A and B being 
stages of the process. A process is a kind of series of states of affairs, 
14
which means that for each time between the beginning and the end 
of the process there is a state of affairs that is a stage of the process 
and the series, i.e. a state of affairs that includes everything that be-
longs to the process and the series at the time. A direct process is a 
series of states of affairs each stage of which is the result of a tendency 
that is based on an earlier stage. Each stage of it (except of course one 
with which the process ends) is the basis of a tendency the result of 
which every later stage is. Each stage is the basis of a tendency to-
wards the later stages, and each stage before it is the basis of a ten-
dency towards it.
An indirect process is a series of states of affairs each stage of which, 
or a part of the stage, and sometimes only a part of the stage, is the 
result of a tendency that is based on an earlier stage. By a part of a 
state of affairs I understand a state of affairs that, together with other 
states of affairs, constitutes it. Some stages of an indirect process 
have a part that is not the result of a tendency based on an earlier 
stage. Each stage of an indirect process (except one with which the 
process ends) is the basis of a tendency towards a later one or to-
wards a part of it, and for each stage (except one with which the 
process begins) there is an earlier one that is the basis of a tendency 
towards it or towards a part of it. Consider, for example, a billiard 
ball rolling between t1 and t3 which you deflect from its straight line 
with your finger at t2. There is an indirect process between t1 and t3 
whose stage at t1 involves only the ball and parts of the table. The 
process is indirect because its stage at t2 has a part that involves your 
finger and that is therefore not the result of a tendency based on the 
stage at t1. 
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About two states of affairs which are elements, or parts thereof, of 
the same process I say that they are connected (directly or indirectly) 
through a process. 
Sometimes where there is an indirect process the situation can be re-
described in terms of a direct process by taking in more states of af-
fairs as parts of the initial stage of the process. Assume A1 and A2 are 
states of affairs at t1, B1 and B2 at t2, and C1 at t3. A1 is the basis of a 
tendency towards B1, B1 and B2 together are the basis of a tendency 
towards C1, A1 and A2 together are the basis of a tendency towards 
B1 and B2. In that case there is an indirect process with A1, B1 plus 
B2, and C1 as stages; and there is a direct process with A1 plus A2, 
B1 plus B2, and C1 as stages. 
For two conflicting tendencies there is an earliest time at which the 
two tendencies point towards incompatible states of affairs. That is 
the point at which the processes following the tendencies form an 
intersection. So that two processes, following tendencies S and T, 
form an intersection at t is to say that S and T are towards states of 
affairs beginning at t which are incompatible, and all states of affairs 
earlier than t towards which S and T point are compatible. 
When a tendency is being realized until some event occurs which is 
incompatible with an event at the same time towards which the ten-
dency was directed, then I say that the tendency, or the process, was 
interfered with, or that something intervened. An intervention may 
occur because of a conflicting tendency, but also because a polter-
geist, or whatever free agents you believe in, makes it occur. 
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Causation
We can try to describe the mechanism that is at work in typical cases 
of causation. In certain cases where there are tendencies it is true to 
say that x caused y. Roughly, x was a cause of y if x was, or was a part 
of, a state of affairs which was the basis of a tendency towards y or 
towards a state of affairs of which y was a part, and the tendency was 
realized.
A state of affairs A at t1 was a complete direct cause (indirect cause 
respectively) of a state of affairs B at t2 if A was an element of a direct 
process (indirect process respectively) of which B was a later element. 
State of affairs A was a partial, as opposed to a complete, cause of 
state of affairs B if A was a part of a state of affairs F which was a part 
of a process of which B was a later element. By a cause I understand 
either a direct or an indirect, complete or partial cause. Speaking 
loosely one can also call a tendency that led to B “cause of B”. Some-
times it is easier to identify a tendency rather than its basis because it 
is difficult to know which state of affairs exactly is the basis of the 
tendency. 
One might object that my definition of causation is circular because I
define causation in terms of a tendency being realized.9 I reply first 
that as I assume that the concept of causation is simple I do not call 
the sentence with which I say what causation is a definition or a con-
ceptual analysis but a description of causation. Second, even if it is 
taken as a definition it is not circular because in the definiens the 
concept of causation or the idea of bringing about does not occur. 
Neither the idea of a tendency nor the idea of a tendency being real-
ized involves the idea of bringing about. Of course, I do not define 
9 I owe this point to ... 
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causation in terms of actual events only. The tendency theory does 
what a non-Humean metaphysical theory of causation should do: it 
says something about the connection that exists in typical cases of 
causation. It identifies the phenomenon that underlies causation, 
namely tendencies, and specifies which occurrences of that phe-
nomenon count as cases of causation, namely ones where a tendency 
is realized.
I only call particular states of affairs causes. In ordinary discourse as 
well as in science we sometimes also say things like “Smoking causes 
cancer”. Such generalisations have to be distinguished from claims 
about what a particular event was caused by. John’s cancer was not 
caused by smoking in general, it was caused by his smoking. Pre-
sumably “Smoking causes cancer” is true if some people’s smoking 
causes them to have cancer. However, I am concerned only with sin-
gular causation, i.e. causation between particular states of affairs. 
There might exist tendencies of different strengths. A tendency can 
be deterministic or probabilistic. I understand by a deterministic ten-
dency a tendency for which it is impossible that it is not realized, 
unless something interferes with it. That is, a deterministic tendency 
is one that necessarily will be realized if nothing interferes with it. 
The only possibility how it may fail to be realized is that something 
interferes. An indeterministic, or “probabilistic”, tendency is one 
where it is possible that it is not realized even if nothing interferes 
with it. For an indeterministic tendency it is possible that it is not 
realized without there being any intervention; it can fail to be real-
ized just by chance. Indeterministic tendencies can be disjunctive, 
that is, they can be towards either A or, instead, B occurring at t2. A 
deterministic tendency can be said to have strength 1. The strength 
of indeterministic tendencies can be described with numbers be-
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tween 0 and 1 corresponding to the probability of outcomes in situa-
tions where nothing intervenes.10
A process is a deterministic process if and only if all tendencies that 
are constitutive of it (i.e. the tendencies leading from one stage of the 
process to another) are deterministic tendencies. A process is a prob-
abilistic process if and only if some of the tendencies that are consti-
tutive of it are probabilistic. 
A is a deterministic cause of B if and only if A is a cause of B and A 
and B are connected through a deterministic process. I call A a prob-
abilistic cause of B if and only if A is cause of B and A and B are con-
nected through a probabilistic process. 
An uncaused event is an event that occurs not as the result of a ten-
dency nor as the result of the free choice of an agent. Presumably an 
uncaused event cannot occur where it would conflict with a ten-
dency. It can occur only in an area of reality where there are no ten-
dencies. So where an uncaused event U occurs there was no tendency 
towards U nor towards an event which is incompatible with U. There 
may well be no uncaused events, but we can make sense of the idea. 
Dispositions, powers, liabilities
There has been a revival of the Aristotelian view that things have 
among their intrinsic properties powers and liabilities (or disposi-
10 Tendencies differ here from Popper’s “propensities” (Popper 1959, 1974). Pop-
per describes the strength of a propensity with a number between 0 and 1 which 
describes the relative frequency of how often the propensity is realized. I object that 
this is inadequate because of the possibility of intervention. The strength of a ten-
dency corresponds to the limiting relative frequency only for a reference containing 
only cases where nothing intervenes. 
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tions, as they are also called). (Harré & Madden 1975) as well as 
(Swinburne 1997) have argued that causes are not events but indi-
vidual things that have powers and liabilities. Similarly (Mumford 
1998) and (Molnar 2003) have argued that powers of things belong 
to the basic constituents of the world.11
The main difference between these theories and the tendency theory 
is that tendencies are based not on things (substances) but on states 
of affairs. I do not say, in the example mentioned above, that the rock 
has a tendency to break the window, but that there is a tendency, 
based on a state of affairs involving the rock but other things as well, 
towards the breaking of the window. Because usually the factors rele-
vant for a tendency are not all in one thing and not all properties of a 
thing are relevant for the tendency.12
However, we can accommodate dispositions in the tendency theory. 
By saying that a concrete object x has a certain disposition I mean 
that x is such that under certain circumstances there would be a cer-
tain tendency whose basis is a state of affairs that involves x. Thus, a 
portion of dynamite has a disposition to explode because under cer-
tain circumstances, e.g. if brought close to fire, it would explode, i.e. 
there would be a tendency towards an explosion (increased air pres-
sure etc.) whose basis is a state of affairs involving the dynamite.
11 A helpful discussion of dispositions is (Lowe 2001). (Katzav 2005) argues that 
dispositions are incompatible with all contemporary conceptions of laws of nature. 
12 Tendencies are ascribed to things for example by (Johansson 2004, ch. 11) and 
(Champlin 1990). Another theory of causation with states of affairs as causes is 
(Armstrong 1997, ch. 14). My own ontology does not have substance as a basic cate-
gory (see [author’s article and book]). 
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Forces are a kind of tendency
One may object that one does not understand what a tendency is or 
that we know nothing about them. Fortunately there is a kind of ten-
dency about which we know quite a lot: Newtonian forces. A force 
acting upon an object is the same as there being a tendency towards 
that object being at certain positions at certain later times. If the ten-
dency is realized, then the object actually moves according to the 
tendency. But the tendency may remain unrealized, for example be-
cause of other forces acting upon the object. So forces are a kind of 
tendency. They are tendencies that concern the position of an object. 
Other tendencies concern other changes (or non-changes) than 
changes of position. 
The tendency theory of causation also gives us a theory of causal laws 
of nature (which I shall develop in detail elsewhere). Causal laws of 
nature say what tendencies there are in what kinds of situations. The 
law of gravity, for example, tells us that there is a certain force when 
two things having certain masses are at a certain distance from each 
other. There is a debate what laws involve besides regularities, but 
there is a wide agreement that they do involve regularities, i.e. that 
they say what kind of event is always followed by what kind of 
event.13 They say something of the type “All Fs are G” or “All Fs are 
followed by G”. But this is not true, because what actually happens 
depends on what other factors there are in the situation. All sorts of 
things may intervene and counteract, e.g. other forces or, say, ghosts. 
13 E.g. David Armstrong, although he strongly rejects the regularity theory of laws, 
assumes in his What is a Law of Nature? that laws have the form “It is a law that Fs 
are Gs” (Armstrong 1983, 77). However, later in the book he considers the possibil-
ity of “oaken” laws. If N(F,G) is an oaken law, then it does not entail that all Fs are G, 
but only that ‘all uninterfered with Fs’ (149) are G.
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John Stuart Mill, wrote therefore in 1872: “All laws of causation, in 
consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated 
in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results.”14 It 
is time to abandon theories that do not take this into account. 
Causes are not sufficient for their effect
This possibility of being “counteracted” is also the reason why causes 
are not sufficient for their effects. Many authors hold that a determi-
nistic cause taken together with the “circumstances” and the laws of 
nature is sufficient for its effect.15 But that is not true. If one billiard 
ball rolls at time t1 towards another one, then it will hit the other one 
at t2 unless something intervenes, but it is possible that something 
intervenes between t1 and t2. Other billiard balls, cats, ghosts or who 
knows what may intervene. If A at t1 was the complete cause of B at 
t2, then it could have happened that A occurs and B fails to occur; 
that is, the occurrence of A does not exclude the non-occurrence of 
B. B “could have” failed to occur not just in the sense of logical pos-
sibility but also in any ordinary sense of “could have”. “A caused B” 
entails that A and B occurred, but this does not mean that a cause 
necessitates its effect. Packing more circumstances into “A” does not 
help the believer in causal sufficiency: the world could have gone ex-
actly as it did till some time after t1 and before t2, and still B could 
14 (Mill 1872, p. 445), quoted in (Cartwright 1989, 177). Cf. (Cartwright 1980) and 
(Champlin 1990, 120). 
15 Mellor, for example, thinks that there are causes which are in this sense ‘suffi-
cient’ for their effects. He writes: ‘By causes that determine their effects I shall mean 
ones that are in the circumstances both sufficient and necessary for them.’ (Mellor 
1995, 133) Similarly (Hausman 1998, 33). Cf. also (Swinburne 1994, 52) and (Bige-
low and Pargetter 1990, 290).
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have failed to occur because something intervened before t2. Even 
keeping the laws fixed does not help: B could have failed to occur 
even though A occurred and the laws never changed. What is impos-
sible is that B does not occur even though A occurs, the laws do not 
change, and nothing intervenes. Whether something intervenes de-
pends on whether there are things around that can and do intervene, 
for example non-living things, animals, ghosts, gods, etc. That noth-
ing intervenes is therefore not a fact about the nature of the cause, 
and therefore it is in no sense true to say about a cause that it is suffi-
cient for its effect. 
You may reply that I am using the wrong sort of modality here and 
that a complete cause is “causally sufficient” for the effect. But it 
would be arbitrary to use “sufficient” in this sense. One may use 
“causally sufficient” for what is sufficient given that the laws of na-
ture do not change, but if A caused B, then B could have failed to oc-
cur even though A occurred and the laws of nature did not change. 
We should stop saying that causes are sufficient for (or “necessitate”) 
their effects. 
“Cause” is a success term
According to the tendency theory tendencies are in a certain sense 
ontologically more fundamental than causation. Tendencies are that 
which is at work in every case of causation. The realisation of ten-
dencies is the mechanism through which an effect is brought about 
by its cause. But not every tendency is a case of causation; not every 
tendency can make a causal claim true. If A is a deterministic ten-
dency towards B but something prevents B from occurring, then A is 
the basis of a tendency towards B but A is not a cause of B. There can 
be tendencies that are not realized, not even partially. We use the 
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term “cause” to refer to cases where a tendency is realized. It is what 
we may call a success term. When we say “A caused B”, part of what 
we claim is that A and B occurred. “Cause” is a success term because 
it refers to a certain phenomenon and singles out only some cases 
where the phenomenon occurs, cases where there is “success”.16 An 
adequate metaphysical theory of causation will identify this phe-
nomenon and describe it. According to the tendency theory, this 
phenomenon that underlies causation are tendencies. As I have ar-
gued above, the fact that by “A caused B” we imply that A and B oc-
curred should not mislead us to think that somehow a cause is suffi-
cient for its effect. 
Active versus permissive causes
The tendency theory of causation allows for an adequate distinction 
between active and permissive causes. Sometimes we say things like 
“Ball A fell into the pocket because ball B, which was close to hitting 
A, just missed A”. According to the definition of a cause that I have 
given above B’s not hitting A is not a cause of A’s falling into the 
pocket, because no state of affairs involving ball B is part of a state of 
affairs that is the basis of a tendency towards A falling into the 
pocket. What I have defined above as a cause can also be called an 
“active cause”. We can call B’s not hitting A a “permissive” (or 
16 In the same sense it is sometimes said that “perceive” is a success term. Someone 
who says “John perceived that p” implies that p. But Peter may be in a mental state 
exactly similar to John’s although p is false. We may say then that Peter and John 
have the same “perceptual experience”. “Perceive” is a success term because it refers 
to perceptual experiences and singles out only some cases of them, namely cases 
where things are as represented in the perceptual experience and where the object of 
the perception caused the experience. 
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“negative”) cause of A’s falling into the pocket. To say that x was y’s 
permissive cause is to say that, had things been in a certain way dif-
ferent, then, instead of y, some other state of affairs would have been 
caused. So the tendency theory of causation does justice to the intui-
tion that there is a difference between active and permissive causa-
tion. 
Processes
According to the tendency theory two events are causally related if 
they are different stages of the same process. And a process is not to 
be defined as a series of events that are connected through causal re-
lations – it is not defined as a “causal chain” – but in terms of ten-
dency. One can in this sense say that, according to the tendency the-
ory, processes are more basic than causal relations. There cannot be 
causally related events that are not connected through a process. 
Tendencies are about how things carry on. Where a tendency is real-
ized there is a process. A stage of a process, then, can be called cause 
of a later stage. For it to be true that A caused B things must have 
carried on after A in a certain way, following the tendency of which 
A was the basis. So I agree with John Venn who said in 1866: “Substi-
tute for the time honoured ‘chain of causation’, so often introduced 
into discussions upon this subject, the phrase a ‘rope of causation’, 
and see what a very different aspect the question will wear.”17 18
17 John Venn, The Logic of Chance (London, 1866), 320, quoted in (Salmon 1980, 
171). 
18 Let me mention the contemporary approaches that are closest to the tendency 
theory and how they differ from it. Alfred Freddoso’s theory of “natural necessity” 
(Freddoso 1986) has much in common with my view. However, one difference is 
25
Counterfactual theories
Let us now confront the tendency theory with two contemporary ap-
proaches to causation which both attempt to reduce causation to 
something else, the counterfactual analysis and the probabilistic 
analysis. Rather than raise objections against these theories I want to 
argue that they do not support the view that there are no causal con-
nections. 
David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation follows Hume’s 
suggestion that “we may define a cause to be an object followed by 
another, and where [...], if the first object had not been, the second 
never had existed”. Simplified, it says for two events A and B where 
A immediately precedes B: A is a cause of B if and only if A and B 
occur and ~A ?→ ~B. (Lewis 1973) ‘~A ?→ ~B’ is spelled out in 
terms of possible worlds as: some world in which neither A nor B 
that he says of the world that it has a certain tendency but not of events or states of 
affairs (p. 225). Another difference is that he thinks that a deterministic tendency 
can only be impeded by “free causes” (p.225), not by other processes. A third differ-
ence is that he says of an event that occurred as the result of a deterministic tendency 
that it occurred “by natural necessity”. I reject the view that a cause necessitates its 
effect. Karl Popper, in his A World of Propensities (1990), proposes to understand 
causation in terms of propensities. Causation, for him, is “just a special case of pro-
pensity: the case of a propensity equal to 1, a determining demand, or force, for reali-
zation” (p. 22). For Hugh Mellor (1995) a cause raises the “chance” of the effect. 
Both Popper and Mellor assume that a propensity of the strongest sort, one with 
strength 1, entails or necessitates the effect; it cannot fail to be realized. “The exis-
tence of the cause ensures [...] that its effects also exist.” (Mellor 1995, 13). I have 
argued that there are no such propensities and no such causes. Every causal process 
can be stopped if there is something strong enough to stop it. This I object also to 
Richard Swinburne’s (Swinburne 1994, ch. 3) theory, which is (like Harré and Mad-
den 1975) is based on powers of substances. He understands “by a full cause one 
whose active causal operation is sufficient for the production of the effect” (p. 52). 
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occur is closer to the actual world (in which A and B occur) than any 
world in which B but not A occur. How close one world is to another 
is a matter of the over-all similarity between them. 
Much has been written about possible counterexamples to Lewis’s 
analysis.19 Instead of looking at these I want to consider whether the 
counterfactual analysis entails, or supports the view, that there are no 
causal connections. Lewis assumes it does: he takes it to be in line 
with his metaphysical doctrine of “Humean supervenience”, i.e. the 
view that “all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of 
particular fact, just one little thing and then another” (Lewis 1986, ix-
x) and that hence there are no causal connections and no tendencies.
Why does Lewis think that his analysis supports Humean superven-
ience? He assumes that in metaphysics one finds out what exists 
through investigating, by conceptual analysis and transforming 
statements, what “existential quantifications” and hence “ontological 
commitments” certain statements contain. If causal beliefs commit 
one to causal connections one should believe in them, but if one can 
transform causal statements or replace them by other statements, 
then one should not believe in them. Lewis’s analysans mentions 
only arrangements of qualities in worlds and similarities between 
worlds, and no causal connections, hence according to the analysis 
beliefs about causings do not commit one to believing in causal con-
nections. Therefore Lewis takes his analysis to support Humean su-
pervenience.
To this I object that Lewis uses the wrong method for finding out 
whether there are causal connections. In order to support Humean 
supervenience one would have to defeat the evidence for causal con-
19 For the most refined version of the counterfactual analysis see (Lewis 2000). 
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nections; for example, one would have to provide an explanation for 
the success of predictions and for the regularities. Further I shall ar-
gue now that the existence of causation according to Lewis’s analysis 
is compatible with the existence of causal connections, such as ten-
dencies. It even requires it and is hence incompatible with Humean 
Supervenience. Let me explain. 
According to Lewis’s theory, if A caused B, and A immediately pre-
cedes B, then some non-A-world in which B does not occur is closer 
to the actual world than any non-A-world in which B does occur is. 
But if Humean supervenience is true then, plausibly, the closest non-
A-world is the world that is just like the actual world except that A 
does not occur in it (call this world “Actual-Minus-A”). In that world 
B occurs. Therefore, if Humean Supervenience is true, then, accord-
ing to the counterfactual analysis, there are no cases of causation. 
Lewis wants to avoid this conclusion by saying that in Actual-Minus-
A there are different laws of nature and that “similarities in matters 
of particular fact trade off against similarities of law” (Lewis 1973, 
163). But according to Humean Supervenience laws are nothing over 
and above the occurrence of certain events. It is therefore more plau-
sible to assume that they also do not make a difference to the order of 
similarity between worlds other than through the occurrence of the 
events that fall under the law. Lewis needs to assume that there exists 
something, over and above “local matters of particular fact”, which 
makes a non-A-world in which B does not occur more similar to the 
actual world than Actual-Minus-A. He needs truthmakers for causal 
counterfactuals. 
Tendencies are a good candidate for being these truthmakers. If the 
actual world contains tendencies and A caused B, then there is no 
possible world that is just like ours except without A; because if you 
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take away A from the actual world you also take away the tendency 
towards B and therefore B does not occur in the non-A world (except 
in cases of overdetermination or preemption). I conclude that the 
counterfactual analysis is compatible with the tendency theory and 
even requires tendencies as truthmakers for causal counterfactuals. 
Approaching the question whether there are causal connections 
through the ontological commitment method, Lewis takes the coun-
terfactual analysis to be in line with Humean supervenience. Reject-
ing this method I have argued that the counterfactual analysis not 
only does not support Humean Supervenience but even, together 
with the assumption that there are cases of causation, is incompatible 
with Humean Supervenience. 
Probabilistic theories
According to probabilistic theories of causation a cause raises the 
probability of its effect. The statement “A caused B” is analyzed as 
“P(B|A) > P(B|not-A)” with some further complicated clauses added 
to take some counterexamples into account.20 Causal talk is reduced 
to talk about probabilities. Would the success of such a theory sup-
port the view that there are no causal connections? I think not. A 
successful probabilistic definition of a cause would pick out correctly 
the pairs of events which can be truly said to be cause and effect by 
describing how they fit into the pattern of the world, i.e. by describ-
ing how often and under which circumstances events of the one type 
are followed in a certain way by events of the other type. But then the 
question arises whether these pairs of events have something in 
common over and above the fact that they fit in a certain way into 
20 For a refined version of such a theory see (Eells 1991) and (Kvart 2004).
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the pattern of the world. Should we assume that there is an explana-
tion why events of type A in certain circumstances are often followed 
by events of type B? It is very unlikely that there would be such regu-
larities if there were no causal connections and if occasionalism were 
false. The tendency theory offers an explanation that is an alternative 
to occasionalism. Of the pairs of events which a successful probabil-
istic theory would pick out one is the basis (or a part thereof) of a 
tendency towards the other, and similar events are the basis of simi-
lar tendencies. That explains why the relative frequencies in some 
cases are as described in the probabilistic definition. If there are pairs 
of events that are according to the probabilistic definition cause and 
effect, then we have reason to believe that there are tendencies. 
Rather than showing that there are no tendencies, the probabilistic 
definition describes what would constitute evidence for the existence 
of tendencies. 
Both, the counterfactual analysis and the probabilistic analysis, on 
the basis of the method of ontological commitment, are supposed to 
support the view that there are no causal connections. Rejecting this 
method, however, I have argued in both cases that if the definitions 
ever apply then there is evidence for the existence of tendencies. 
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